Chishimba Kambwili v Attorney General 2019/CC/009 by Kaaba, O\u27Brien & Sambo, Pamela T.
SAIPAR Case Review 
Volume 3 
Issue 1 May 2020 Article 7 
5-2020 
Chishimba Kambwili v Attorney General 2019/CC/009 
O'Brien Kaaba 
University of Zambia 
Pamela T. Sambo 
University of Zambia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/scr 
 Part of the African Studies Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kaaba, O'Brien and Sambo, Pamela T. (2020) "Chishimba Kambwili v Attorney General 2019/CC/009," 
SAIPAR Case Review: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/scr/vol3/iss1/7 
This Case Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in SAIPAR Case Review by an authorized editor of 
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu. 





Chishimba Kambwili v Attorney General 2019/CC/0091 
O’Brien Kaaba2 and Pamela Towela Sambo3 
Facts 
The Constitutional Court on 18th February 2020 rendered its judgment in the case of Chishimba 
Kambwili v Attorney General 2019/CCZ/009. The petitioner, then an estranged Member of 
Parliament for the ruling Patriotic Front (PF), had his seat declared vacant in February 2019 by 
the Speaker of the National Assembly, Patrick Matibini, on the ground that by acting as a 
consultant for an opposition party (under which he was not elected to Parliament), he had 
crossed the floor. 
 
Holding 
The Constitutional Court found the action of the Speaker to have been unconstitutional as the 
office is not vested with power to interpret or resolve constitutional problems. This power is 
vested in the judiciary and the Speaker, therefore, usurped the powers of the judiciary. 
However, despite finding that the Speaker acted unconstitutionally in unseating the petitioner, 
the Constitutional Court dismissed the petition and declined to grant any remedy. This 
commentary argues that the decision of the Constitutional Court in this respect is incorrect, 
negates the supremacy of the Constitution and demonstrates lack of appreciation of basic 
considerations for constitutional adjudication. 
 
Significance 
One of the first things that is shocking about the judgment is the apparent failure to understand 
the remedy sought by the petitioner. Page 2 of the judgment lists the remedies sought by the 
petitioner. The first and arguably most important remedy is stated as “a declaration and order 
that the ruling of the Speaker dated 27th February, 2019 is null and void ab initio.” It is clear 
from this that the petitioner sought the remedy of a declaration of invalidity, whose effect would 
be to render null and void, the Speaker’s decision to unseat the petitioner. Nowhere in its entire 
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judgment, does the Constitutional Court discuss this remedy. For reasons not stated in the 
judgment, the Constitutional Court instead discusses the remedy of a declaratory judgment and 
proceeds to assert that it has discretion to decline to grant it.  The two remedies – declaratory 
judgement and a declaration of invalidity - are completely different.   
 
On the one hand, a declaratory judgment simply defines the rights of the parties relative to the 
legal question under consideration. It indicates whether the parties may seek or are entitled to 
the relief they desire. In the words of Borchard, “their distinctive characteristic lies in the fact 
that they constitute merely an authoritative confirmation of the already existing relations.”4 
Such declaratory judgments at common law are granted at the discretion of the Court. From 
the record, it is clear that this is not the remedy the petitioner sought from the Constitutional 
Court.   
 
On the other hand, a declaration of invalidity as a constitutional remedy nullifies any law or 
action that violates the provisions of the Constitution. Once the Constitutional Court arrives at 
the conclusion that a provision of the Constitution has been violated, it retains no discretion, 
and must issue a mandatory order of invalidity. The mandatory order or declaration of 
invalidity is premised on the supremacy of the Constitution for the reason that anything done 
in violation of the Constitution is a nullity. This is the unambiguous import of Article 1(1) and 
(2) of the Constitution of Zambia, which provides that the Constitution is the supreme law of 
the Republic of Zambia and any other written law or practice that is inconsistent with its 
provisions is void to the extent of the inconsistency. Further, Article 1(2) of the Constitution 
unequivocally provides that any act or omission that contravenes the Constitution is illegal. 
The consequences of any illegality, more so in violation of the Constitution, must be remedied; 
and the Constitutional Court is accordingly enslaved to so act by the supreme law.    
 
As constitutional law scholar, Pierre De Vos has asserted, it is mandatory for the Court to issue 
an order of invalidity against laws or actions that violate the provisions of the Constitution and 
further that this “obligation to declare law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution 
to be invalid flows logically from the fact that the Constitution is supreme."5 In relation to 
granting of an order of invalidity as a constitutional remedy, the Constitutional Court, therefore, 
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enjoys no discretion and should have unambiguously declared the Speaker’s action null and 
void.  
 
It is beyond comprehension that a specialised Constitutional Court could misdirect itself in 
such a manner as evidenced by this judgment. It is clear that the petitioner sought an order of 
invalidity but the Constitutional Court instead, and unmoved by anyone, formulated its own 
remedy and dismissed it of its own accord. No reasons are advanced by the Constitutional 
Court for this decision. It however appears, that the Constitutional Court was following its own 
precedent of substituting claimants’ legal questions, on its own motion as established in Danny 
Pule and 3 others v. The Attorney- General and Davies Mwila6 (the ‘Presidential Eligibility’ 
Case) where the applicants’ two questions were substituted by the Constitutional Court’s new 
and single one.  If we were to hazard a guess, it would seem that the Constitutional Court was 
apprehensive of the political consequences of invalidating the Speaker’s unconstitutional 
decision. The Constitutional Court cited two potential ‘disruptions’ it sought to avoid.  First, 
the Constitutional Court took the view that the petitioner was already replaced as a Member of 
Parliament in a by-election; and secondly, that nullifying the Speaker’s decision would mean 
having two Members of Parliament for the same constituency, which, in the eyes of the 
Constitutional Court, would result in a constitutional crisis.  
 
Two things can be said about the approach taken by the Constitutional Court. First, when a 
Court is overly concerned about the political consequences of its decisions, and makes 
decisions on the basis of its interpretation of supposed consequences without elaborating any 
objective standard test for its action, such a Court opens itself to perceptions of acting in 
furtherance of personal inclinations and against the rule of law. Having judicial officers who 
make decisions that tie their findings to political consequences, basically invites them to make 
subjective evaluation of consequences of their prospective decisions. Such an approach to 
constitutional adjudication, warned retired Ugandan Supreme Court judge, George 
Kanyeihamba, “transports the judge from the heights of legality and impartiality to the deep 
valleys of personal inclinations and political judgment.”7 
                                                             
6 2017/CCZ/004 Selected Judgment No. 60 of 2018 
7 Kizza Besigye vs. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni Presidential Election Petition No.1 of 2006. See the dissenting 
opinion of Kanyeihamba, JSC, p.304. See also O’Brien Kaaba, The Challenge of Adjudicating Presidential 
Election Disputes in Africa: Exploring the Viability of Establishing An African Supranational Elections 
Tribunal (LLD Thesis, University of South Africa 2015) 105 
 





Secondly, the position of the Constitutional Court that there would be a constitutional crisis as 
there was an already held by-election, which had replaced the petitioner, does not hold water. 
It in fact betrays a tragic misunderstanding of constitutional law by the Court. Where a law or 
an act offends the Constitution, it is becomes wholly invalid, or void ab initio. In this case, it 
would have meant reverting to the status quo prior to the Speaker’s decision. There would, 
therefore be no other Member of Parliament for the concerned constituency except the 
petitioner in the eyes of the law. There is a lot of comparative academic literature and 
jurisprudence that the Constitutional Court could have explored to settle at a more informed 
decision. For instance, the Nigerian case of Amaechi vs. Independent National Electoral 
Commission and Others,8 involving a state governorship election is illustrative. The Nigerian 
Constitution and electoral laws required parties to have primary elections for selecting 
candidates. Those who won primaries were the legally recognised political party candidates. 
The petitioner stood as a candidate for a governorship primary and won the election and, was 
therefore, by law, supposed to be the concerned party’s candidate in the election. His political 
party, however, declined to adopt him and gave the adoption certificate to another person who 
was not selected through primaries. This new person stood as a state governor and won the 
election. In the ensuing legal battle, the Nigerian Supreme Court held that the person who was 
declared winner of the state governorship position was in fact not the rightful winner and 
therefore annulled his election and declared the petitioner as the legitimate governor. The 
Nigeria Supreme Court reasoned that the replacement of the petitioner was illegal and a nullity 
as his candidature was in violation of the Constitution and the law. Consequently, in the eyes 
of the law, the petitioner was the one who was adopted as a candidate, and therefore, the rightful 
governor. 
 
The approach taken by the Nigerian Supreme Court is the more legally and procedurally correct 
one because no act that violates constitutional provisions must be given validity. As noted 
already, this derives from and gives effect to the doctrine of the supremacy of the Constitution. 
To hold otherwise is to desecrate the Constitution. This however, is not to argue that orders of 
invalidity cannot be disruptive. They can and there is well-developed comparative 
jurisprudence on how judges can tailor orders of invalidity to specific contexts in order to 
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contain the consequences of invalidity.9 This, however, is not what the Constitutional Court in 
Zambia did. 
 
Finally, we wish to point out the potential dangers of the judgment. Democracy scholars, 
Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, in a 2018 publication,10 extensively study the current 
global phenomena of democratic backsliding. Unlike in the past when democracies could be 
killed by dramatic events such military coups, the authors carefully demonstrate that the current 
backlash against democracy is subtle, invisible and lets democracy erode slowly through minor 
often seemingly inconsequential acts. This new phenomenon of killing democracy does not use 
generals or military personnel but weaponises the same institutions created to protect rule of 
law and democracy. This is facilitated by such institutions making subtle decisions which, 
cumulatively and overtime, prove extremely potent in undermining democracy.  
 
The Constitutional Court judgment seems to validate Levitsky and Ziblatt’s well-reasoned 
views. It is a decision that rewards rather than punishes those who mutilate the Constitution. 
The Constitutional Court’s reasoning, when pushed to its logical conclusion, entails that where 
someone violates the Constitution, and that violation causes a disruption, it follows that the 
norms of the Constitution cannot be enforced. Obeying the Constitution becomes optional for 
the ruling elite. Under this thinking, the consequences of the misconduct take precedence over 
the supremacy of the Constitution. The ruling elite are, therefore, allowed to mutilate the 
Constitution and get away with it, given the full imprimatur of the Constitutional Court. It goes 
without saying that such an approach to constitutional adjudication is an abnegation of the rule 
of law and the abdication of the duty of the judge as a guardian of constitutionalism and 
enforcer of constitutional norms. Retired South African Constitutional law judge, Albie Sachs 
correctly admonished judges when he said, “it would be a strange interpretation of our 
Constitution that suggests that adherence by the government in any of its activities to the 
foundational norms that paved the way to its creation was merely an option and not a duty.”11  
 
In his recently published book, Supreme Court judge, Mumba Malila, asserts that during his 
time as a law lecturer at the University of Zambia, he endeavoured to use Zambian case law 
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authorities in his pedagogical work. He was, however, often disappointed that many decisions 
from the Courts tended to fall short in some vital respects as they were “poorly researched, 
lacklustre and deficient in depth or clarity.”12 Justice Malila’s words ring true about this 
judgment as the decision is lacking in depth, undermines the supremacy of the Constitution and 
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